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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HtUGIR SIXICLtR*
A number of cases of considerable interest and importance were
decided by the Supreme Court in the field of constitutional law. In
many instances, the holdings also relate to public corporations but
since these cases were decided on constitutional grounds, it has been
decided to review them under this heading.
Two of the cases decided during the past year are of far-reaching
consequence. They are those which involved the validity of Colum-
bia's Standards for Dwellings Ordinance and the same city's Urban
Redevelopment Program. The first case, Richards v. City of Cohn-
bia,l relates to the Ordinance prescribing standards for dwelling units
wherein humans inhabit. The second, Edens v. City of Cohlnbia,,
2
relates to the constitutionality of Columbia's Urban Redevelopment
Program and the statute of South Carolina authorizing the same.
The first challenge failed and the court, by a 3 to 2 decision upheld
the right of the City of Columbia, and other South Carolina munici-
palities with a population of more than five thousand persons, to regu-
late the standard of dwellings where human beings live. The second,
a far-reaching plan designed to enable cities to remove slums through
an overall program which would set apart areas formerly of slum
character for a different character of use, did not survive the attack
made upon it. Both plans stem from statutes designed to furnish
incorporated municipalities with a means of removing slums and
blighted areas and modernizing the communities in a way conducive
to urban living.
The last two decades have seen a marked change in the develop-
ment of American cities. Prior to the advent of the automobile,
distances within the urban area itself were a matter of concern.
Space and distance were then factors that were very real. People,
of necessity, lived crowded together. The advent of the automobile
is the great factor in the development of our suburbs. People wish-
ing the advantages of city life no longer have to live in the crowded
city itself but can get outside where space and air are more plenti-
ful. For this reason, there is less incentive to properly maintain the
'B.A., College of Charleston; LL.B., University of South Carolina; member City Council
of Charleston, 1939-43; member State Legislature, 1932-36 and 1915- member of Charleston
County, South Carolina, and American Bar Associations. Member of firm of Sinider, Gibbs
& Simmons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E. 2d 683 (1955).
2. 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E. 2d 280 (1956).
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older sections in the city itself. Single unit houses are converted into
multiple apartments. They become less and less desirable. Of neces-
sity, rents are reduced and maintenance stops. Thus, slums and
blighted areas spring up. The growth of the city has continued to
the point where many of these sections do have a real potential if
they can be properly utilized. Frequently, they can be utilized once
again for residential use. Sometimes this can be accomplished by an
individual or by groups of individuals. Several notable restorations
of this sort have taken place in downtown Charleston. But too often
it is beyond the ability of the individual and frequently, key parcels
of the area cannot be acquired. If these slums are to be removed, a
governmental hand is needed. Doubtless with these factors in mind
were the two statutes enacted.
In the Richards case the Ordinance established definite standards
wherein human beings live. These included:
A. Inside running water connected to a kitchen sink, and to
a lavatory or laundry sink, and to a bathtub or shower, and to a
toilet, all connected to the public sewer, or other disposal ap-
proved by the City Board of Health;
B. Adequate screens and glass panes for all doors and windows;
C. Fireplaces, flues, or other provisions for heating to afford
reasonable comfort;
D. A window in each living room and bedroom which opens not
less than 45% of its area and can be effectively opened and closed
as a means of ventilation;
R. Electrical wiring system connected and installed in accord-
ance with the electrical ordinance of the City;
F. Privacy for toilet and tub or shower, effectively ventilated;
G. The roof, flashings, exterior walls, basement walls, floors
and all doors and windows exposed to the weather constructed
and maintained so as to be reasonably weather tight and water
tight, and sound and safe, and capable of affording privacy.
The court approved, as a sound postulate of law, the proposition that:
When a building used as a dwelling house is unfit for that use
and a source of danger to the community, the Legislature in
order to promote the general welfare may require its alteration
or require that its use for a purpose which injures the public
be discontinued; and, subject to reasonable limitation, the Legis-
lature may determine what alterations should be required and
what conditions may constitute a menace to the public welfare
and call for remedy.
[Vol. 9
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It further said "Police 'power is, and must be from its very nature,
incapable of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoy-
ment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property.'
Mr. Justice Miller, in Re Slaughterhouse Cases, 1872, 16 Wall. 36, 21
L. Ed. 394."
Upon these principles, they upheld practically all provisions of
the Ordinance in the face of a two-judge dissent which seemed to
feel that too many of its provisions had no direct bearing upon pub-
lic safety, health, peace and morals, but on the contrary denied a
freedom of choice which the city dweller should have even though
it involved "personal hygiene".
Unfortunately, the very nature of urban areas requires everyone
to be interested in the hygiene of his neighbor, for epidemics, while
frequently starting in slum conditions, do not confine themselves to
those areas.
The dissent in the Richards case probably foretold the doom of
the Urban Redevelopment plan.
Edens v. City of Columbias is the suit brought to determine the
validity of the condemnation provision of the South Carolina Urban
Redevelopment Law.4 The Urban Redevelopment Law of South
Carolina follows the pattern of similar statutes enacted in practi-
cally every state of the United States and in the District of Columbia
as well. Its declared purpose was to facilitate, with abundant Feder-
al financial assistance, the redevelopment of urban regions in the
state by the removal therefrom of so-called blighted areas. Little
doubt exists but that there are many such areas in all of our cities.
The statute requires the adoption of an overall plan for the city and
empowers the acquisition of land in order to implement the plan.
Mindful that all property could not be acquired voluntarily, the pow-
er of eminent domain is given. After the slum or blighted area was
removed, the developing agency was empowered to sell the land to
private persons or corporations upon the condition that the future
utilization of the land will be for the purpose designated in the plan.
The constitutional question involved arises from Section 17 of Ar-
ticle I of our Constitution which provides:
Private property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensa-
tion being first made therefor.
3. See note 2 supra.
4. CODE or LAws OF SOUrT CARorixA, §§ 36-401 thru 36-414.
1956]
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The question narrowed into whether a taking which afterwards
could be disposed of to private persons constituted a taking for a
public use.
Similar questions were involved in suits attacking the constitu-
tionality of most of the statutes of other states. The great majority
of these decisions followed the pattern of the Virginia Court in the
case of Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority.5
The Virginia Court found that the primary purpose of the legisla-
tion was the elimination and rehabilitation of blighted and slum sec-
tions of urban areas, and that the removal of these areas was a public
use of the land. The Virginia Court noted that when the need for
public ownership which occasioned the taking terminated, it was per-
fectly proper to transfer the property to private ownership. Our
court, however, followed the Supreme Courts of Florida and Georgia
and became the third state to reject this view. Our court looked not
to the removal of the slum areas, but to the use of the land subse-
quent to their removal. It therefore, interpreted the words "public
use" in the constitutional provision literally and found that a taking
under this statute would violate the constitutional inhibition. It con-
ceded that public benefit might arise, but held that public benefit and
public use were not synonymous.
If, as the statute says, a principal purpose of the plan is to remove
slums, it would seem that the taking subserved a public rather than
a private use.
Almost twenty years ago our court upheld governmental action for
the removal of slums. In the case of McNulty v. Owens,6 the court,
after noting a legislative finding that slum clearance was necessary
to the public health and to better public morals, held that the slum
clearance and low cost housing project planned by the Columbia
Housing Authority was an exercise of a proper governmental func-
tion and for a valid public purpose. It followed this holding by
approving the exercise of the power of eminent domain. As to the
exercise of this power, the court said:
Having reached the conclusion that the project is for a public
purpose, it follows that the power of eminent domain may be
exercised if that power be necessary in acquiring property for
shm clearance - and because of the public purpose of the pro-
ject, it does not constitute a taking of property for private pur-
poses within the prohibition of Section 17, Article I, of the Con-
stitution. (Italics added)
5. 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E. 2d 893 (1953).
6. 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938).
[Vol., 9
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The holding in the McNulty case was reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Benjamin v. Housing Authority of Darlington
CountyZ There, in order to give an opportunity to slum dwellers
and impoverished agricultural workers to remove themselves and
their families to healthful living conditions, the court upheld a public
housing development to be situated outside of the incorporated muni-
cipality in more or less rural areas of the County. The Court said:
'We conclude that the program of the Authority is for a public
purpose, both because it will eliminate unsanitary dwelling units
and because it will provide sanitary homes and living conditions
for farm families of low income. While necessarily the pro-
gram differs in detail from that of an urban housing develop-
ment, we find nothing that would justify a decision differing
from that of this Court in the McNulty case.' (Italics added)
Thus it seemed clear from these cases that both slum clearance and
low cost housing are public purposes. In the Edens case the court
seemed to lose sight of slum clearance and consider only the subse-
quent disposal of the property after the slum was removed. To the
writer, removal of the blighted area is the basic object of the statute.
The subsequent disposal of the real estate is the byproduct.
Unfortunately, the court was obviously adversely impressed by
the rather ridiculous language of Justice Douglas of the Supreme
Court of the United States in upholding the District of Columbia
Urban Redevelopment Act. There Douglas said:
• . . The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive
(Citing cases). The values it represents are spiritual as well
as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the pow-
er of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well bal-
anced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations
that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us
to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Colum-
bia decide that the nation's capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.8
Quite properly, this fanciful language was roundly condemned in
the American Bar Association journal and other periodicals, but the
7. 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E. 2d 737 (1941).
8. 348 U.S. 26,75 S. Ct. 98 (1954).
f956] "'
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real objection to the Berman holding lies not in its vacuous language
but in the shocking abdication of the judicial power to review the
finding of the administrative agency carrying out the redevelopment
plan. Certainly there will be cases where property should not be ac-
quired because it does not fall within the category of slum property
and does not by itself block the implementation of the general plan,
but the real solution lies not in the broad denial of the power to con-
demn, but rather in the preservation of judicial review in all in-
stances. The great genius of our government is that courts stand
ready to prevent tyranny -obviously Douglas does not take kindly
to constitutional government as it was intended by those who wrote
our Constitution.
Later this same year, our court quoted the following language with
approval in Dargan v. Richardson :9
... It has often been declared that all property is acquired and
held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
destroy or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
community.
On the basis of this statement, the court held that the invitee, fish-
ing in a private pond for a fee, could not take fish without a license.
There is no objection to that holding. It seems well supported by
authority, but it does seem somewhat feudalistic that trout are pro-
tected but unfortunate persons dwelling in the many slum areas of
our cities are left to struggle for themselves.
No action has been taken to amend the Constitution as suggested
by the court, and the whole Urban Redevelopment Program in South
Carolina is dead. When the progress in removing slums in the
great metropolitan areas of the country is observed, it seems a shame
that we must participate in paying the cost, but stand deprived of
benefits locally.
In Dargan v. Richardson10 the plaintiff Dargan, owned certain
fish ponds which she stocked at her own expense and permitted per-
sons desiring to fish therein to do so upon payment to her of a fee.
After certain of her patrons had been arrested by Game Wardens for
fishing without a South Carolina license, she brought suit to enjoin the
enforcement of the statute requiring the procuring of a license on the
theory that it was in derogation to property rights guaranteed to her
by the Constitution. The court, after reviewing authorities else-
where, held that the regulations were reasonable, and that they did
9. 229 S.C. 135, 92 S.E. 2d 167 (1956).
10. See note 9 supra.
(Vol. 9
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not deprive plaintiff of her property rights. In so doing, the court
cited, with approval, the language from the Massachusetts Court,
noting that all property is held and acquired under the tacit condi-
tion that it shall not be so used as to destroy or impair public rights
and interests of the community. In other words, the acceptance of
government in any form carries with it not only the privileges derived
from law and order, but the burden as well of conducting oneself
and using one's property in a way which will not adversely affect
the community interests of the governed.
Wilder v. South Carolina State Highway Departinent11 is a con-
troversy arising from the provision in the 1954 State Appropriations
Act which empowered the Highway Department to add to each motor
vehicle license fee 30c to cover postage charges. The Highway De-
partment proceeded to charge the 30c in all instances, that is, both
where the licenses were mailed and where the licenses were issued
at its regional offices throughout the state. Plaintiff brought suit to
recover 60c overcharged him on two automobile license tags which
he had picked up in person at the Sumter office of the Highway De-
partment. The plaintiff sought to make his suit a class suit, for among
other relief, he sought an allowance of attorneys' fees and costs out of
the fund which he hoped to create for all who had been thus over-
charged. The court below had sustained the plaintiff in theory by
overruling a demurrer of the Highway Department, notwithstanding
that there was no statutory authorization allowing the state to be sued
on such a cause of action.
Following the institution of the suit, the Highway Department
had discontinued its practice of charging 30c for license plates which
were delivered in person, and during the pendency of the action
made numerous attempts to return to plaintiff his 60c. It announced
its willingness to treat all others in the same way.
The court stated that while there was authority in other states
which permitted suits against the state to recover an unlawful tax
or assessment, South Carolina decisions did not permit a recovery
requiring return of such illegal taxes, in the absence of a statute
creating such right of action. The court held that no statute existed
which permitted this suit, and as a consequence held that it could
not be maintained. In argument before the Supreme Court, the plain-
tiff attempted to invoke the due process clause in the State Constitu-
tion. The court held that this provision had no application in this
instance.
The court was obviously impressed with the facts of this case and
11. 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E. 2d 635 (1956).
1956]
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the statement in the brief of the Attorney General that the Depart-
ment had collected postage charges from approximately 400,000 per-
sons who had purchased their license tags over the counter. It there-
fore said that it would not decide what remedy would be available if
the Highway Department should arbitrarily refuse to refund the 30c
to those who applied in person therefor.
Schuinacher v. Crawford12 discloses a most interesting set of facts
and a sound application of the proposition of law that retrospective
legislation cannot impair vested property rights by reason of the con-
stitutional inhibition against depriving persons of property without
due process of law. There are other interesting questions of law in
the case as well, but this is the most important question for the pur-
poses of this review.
One James Wister Crawford first married one Pearl Briggs by
lawful ceremony on February 26, 1906. Out of this marriage the
successful litigant Jeannette C. Chapin was born. Sometime follow-
ing Jeannette's birth, Crawford removed himself from Clinton where
he had established a home for his wife and daughter and took himself
to Columbia where he proceeded to remarry (without benefit of di-
vorce but apparently with benefit of clergy) one Pauline Grant. Out
of this marriage Eleanor Pauline Crawford Schumacher was born.
At the time of this purported second marriage, the law of South
Carolina very clearly stated that marriages contracted while either
party had a spouse living should be void.
In 1951 the General Assembly amended that law by adding the
following proviso:
Provided, further, that when either of the contracting parties
enters into the marriage contract in good faith and in ignorance
of the incapacity of the other party, any children born of the mar-
riage shall be deemed legitimate and have the same legal rights
as a child born in lawful wedlock.
Crawford died intestate on November 2nd, 1952. This date is of
great significance in disposition of the case. In codifying the 1951
proviso, its language was changed so that when, on November 19th,
1952, the Governor signed the Act declaring that the Code was the
sole statutory law of South Carolina as of January 8th, 1952, the
proviso read:
When either of the contracting parties to a marriage that is
void under the provisions of Section 20-6 entered into the mar-
12. 228 S.C. 77, 88 S.E. 2d 874 (1955).
[Vol.
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riage contract in good faith and in ignorance of the incapacity
of the other party, any children born of the marriage shall be
deemed legitimate and have the same legal rights as a child born
in lawful wedlock. (Italics added)
The case involved a contest between the two daughters of the twice
married Crawford. Daughter Eleanor Pauline contended that the
language of the 1952 Code controlled, notwithstanding the fact that
Crawford had died seventeen days before the Governor signed the
Act making it the only statutory law of South Carolina. In other
words, by changing the word "enters" to "entered" the prospective
intention of the 1951 statute had been converted into a statute which
was retrospective in application. The court noted that the question
to be answered was the effective date of the Code insofar as it applied
to the case, and it held that if the court adopted the construction
sought by Eleanor Pauline, it would have the effect of divesting
daughter Jeannette of a vested property interest. The court said
that this could not be done and that such a disposition of the question
was required by Section 8, of Article I of the Constitution.
This ruling disposed of the case, but notwithstanding the court
went on to decide the case again on a different ground. This time
it concluded that the language in the 1952 Code was ambiguous,
which permitted the court to resort to the original Act to determine
legislative intent. The decisions which the court cites which enables
it to resort to original enactments to solve ambiguities in Code pro-
visions are perfectly sound but hardly applicable here where the
language of the Code is plain and free from ambiguity and when the
point at issue had already been decided. There was a very specific
purpose on the part of the framers of our Constitution when they
provided for a decennial codification of our laws. They wished to
spare the public and the lawyer the necessity for going through each
and every volume of the Statutes in order to ascertain a provision of
statutory law. (State v. Meares.13 ) Consequently, it seems to the
writer that the court should be extremely reluctant to go back of the
Code for any reason, and it should do so only when no other method
can be found to effect the determination of the controversy then be-
fore it.
As noted by the court in State v. Conally,14 coordinate with the
rule which permits resort to the original statute in case of ambiguity
is the rule which should be equally respected, vriz.:
13. 148 S.C. 118, 145 S.E. 695 (1928).
14. 227 S.C. 507, 88 S.E. 2d 591 (1955).
1956]
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Where the meaning of a code provision is plain and unambigu-
ous the court cannot recur to the original statute for the pur-
pose of ascertaining its meaning. The ambiguity must be ap-
parent in the revised version itself; resort to the original enact-
ment must be for the purpose of solving not creating the ambigu-
ity.
Doyle v. Rosen'5 involves no important principle of constitutional
law - rather it is an interpretation of a special constitutional amend-
ment relating to the bonded debt of Georgetown; a secondary ques-
tion related to a provision of the revenue bond act for utilities.
16
The original stringent debt limitations imposed by Section 7, Ar-
ticle VIII and Section 5, Article X, had been relaxed in so far that
the City of Georgetown was concerned to bonds whose proceeds were
applied to the city's water works system, sewerage system, and its
municipal gas and electric light plants, where the entire revenue aris-
ing from the operation of such a plant was devoted solely and exclu-
sively to the maintenance and the operation of the same. Litigant
Doyle contended that this provision meant that water works revenue
must be devoted to the water works system and hence Georgetown
could not combine its systems and pledge the revenue from the
combined systems to pay principal and interest on bonds whose pro-
ceeds were to be used in part to improve the sewerage system which
admittedly produced no revenue at all.
The court did not agree with this construction and permitted
Georgetown to consolidate its water works system, its sewerage and
electric light and gas systems and pledge the revenue of the systems
as thus combined for improvements to any of the three combined
units.
A provision in the revenue bond act for utilities required that
provision for debt service or bonds issued pursuant to it be made
prior to the payment of operation and maintenance costs. George-
town had outstanding bonds payable from net revenues; hence, the
bonds which it sought to issue had to be made payable from revenues
remaining after operation and maintenance had been met. To dis-
pose of this question, the court referred to its recent decision of
City of Spartanburg v. Blalockh7 and held that the real intent of
the revenue bond act was to enable all municipalities of the state to
utilize its provisions to the extent that conditions and their outstand-
ing obligations permitted; an answer which sustained the action taken
15. 229 S.C. 67, 91 S.E. 2d 887 (1956).
16. Corni or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 59-361 thru 59-415.
17. 223 S.C. 252, 75 S.E. 2d 361 (1953).
[Vol. 9
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by Georgetown even though the disposition of the revenue from the
utilities systems did not literally conform to the order set out in Code
Section 59-402.
Dunham v. Davis.'8 This was an action by the heirs of one W. A.
Dunham to recover possession of a tract of land which had been
owned by W. A. Dunham at the time of his intestate death in 1913.
The defendant claimed title under a tax deed. There had been no
administration of the estate of W. A. Dunham, and the property
had been sold to the defendant in January, 1936, at a tax sale for de-
linquent taxes in the name of "Estate of W. A. Dunham" in which
name the property was returned for taxes and the levy made. The
tax deed was dated May 10, 1937, and was delivered to the defendant
during May of 1937. The 1936 tax sale was conceded by the defen-
dant to be invalid, but the defendant contended that it was validated
by Act No. 259 of the 1947 Acts of the General Assembly (parts
of which are now codified as Sections 65-2769 and 65-2769.1) and
that, therefore, the plaintiffs were barred by the two year statute.
Section 1 of the 1947 Act provided that a levy and sale of proper-
ty for delinquent taxes could be made in the name of the person in
whose name the property was returned for taxation whether or not
he "be deceased or in existence at the time of the levy and/or sale
without naming or referring to the heirs or estate of such owner".
Section 3 provided "That this Act shall apply to sales heretofore
made, as aforesaid, and such sales are hereby confirmed; provided,
however, this Act shall not be construed so as to effect suits or
actions pending on claims heretofore actually made against purchas-
ers or their heirs or grantees." (Incidentally, Section 3 was omitted
in the codification of the Act in the 1952 Code. However, for the
purpose of this case, the court assumed without deciding that the ap-
plicability of Section 3 to prior tax sales was not affected by its
omission from the 1952 Code).
The court held that Section 3 of the 1947 Act did not validate
a void tax sale on the ground that title to the property had vested
in the plaintiffs prior to the tax sale, and they were not affected by it
because the sale was void. "Retroactive application of the 1947 Act
would be dearly unconstitutional as depriving them of property
without due process of law."
The court recognized that the Legislature, by a curative or validat-
ing statute which is necessarily retrospective in character and retro-
active in effect, can validate any act which it might originally have
18. 229 S.C. 29, 91 S.E. 2d 716 (1956).
1956]
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authorized subject to the constitutional limitation against depriving
persons of property without due process of law.
Thus, in an action between private litigants, the court has protected
property rights against deprivation without due process. This is a
sound decision.
The case of Bynum v. Barron.19 involves the validity of a compro-
mise and settlement effected by the General Assembly through the
enactment of a directive in the 1954 York County Supply Act.
An attempt had been made in the 1946 Supply Act for York Coun-
ty to increase the compensation of York County Treasurer, D. D.
McCarter, by adding to his salary future "execution fees and execu-
tion fees since his term of office began July 1, 1941". The Annual
Supply Bills for several years following contained a similar provision
In 1949 a taxpayer's suit was instituted to enjoin the payment of fur-
ther tax execution fees to McCarter and to require him to account
for such as had theretofore been paid to him, on the ground that such
payments were illegal. A rule to show cause issued against Mc-
Carter was followed by a temporary restraining order. No further
proceedings were had in that action.
With that action pending, in 1954 the York County Supply Act
noted that from the tax executions then in the hands of the delin-
quent tax collector of York County, fees due to McCarter for having
issued the executions would equal or exceed the fees which would
have accrued to McCarter from July 1, 1941, to July 1, 1946 (the
period when McCarter's compensation was salary alone unless the
retroactive attempt to give him the fees noted was effective). It,
therefore, directed that McCarter be paid the Treasurer's fees on such
executions, and that the acceptance on his part would bar him from
asserting any claims in the future for fees on tax executions. Numer-
ous contentions were made that the settlement act was invalid, but
the most important of these is that which challenged the legislative
power to effect the compromise and settlement of the pending con-
troversy in the courts. The court held that such power existed if
the facts relied on by the Legislature to justify its action were not
found to be inaccurate. In so holding, the court noted that legisla-
tive findings of fact were presumptively correct and will be accepted
by the court in the absence of allegation and proof to the contrary.
No quarrel can be found with this principle of law. Its application
to the facts of this case give rise to question. One must note that the
method of compensating the Treasurer is most devious. Clearly, the
19. 227 S.C. 339, 88 S.E. 2d 67 (1955).
Vol. 9
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attempt to provide compensation to a public officer for services after
the same had been rendered is invalid as violative of Section 30, of
Article III, of the Constitution. Thus the pending suit must have
succeeded in preventing McCarter from obtaining the fees prior to
1946. Therefore, it is difficult to see what there was to compromise.
True, the General Assembly might provide by law for future com-
pensation of a county officer by fees, notwithstanding that he former-
ly had been placed on a salary basis of compensation exclusively. But,
by the tame token, public officers have no contractual or property
rights in their offices and their salaries may be reduced during the
period of time for which they have been elected to serve. Further-
more, under the South Carolina Constitution, as now amended, this
can be accomplished by special act. Hence, if the General Assembly
wished to stop McCarter from drawing compensation on the execu-
tion fees subsequent to the effective date of the 1954 Supply Act,
it had merely so to state. If it did not so state, but wished McCarter
to have fees, that too could have been accomplished. But here, while
admitting that McCarter had no right to fees prior to 1946, the court
lets him have them as a compromise. Thus, by indirection, there is
brought about that as to which direct action is forbidden. The de-
cision should have gone the other way.
Flenming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company20 is not an
unexpected nail in the coffin which is about to bury civilized man's
greatest effort at self-government. Nor does this decision in itself
do too much harm; for today the local bus is not in the universal
use that the street car was forty years ago. Hence, of itself,
the conclusion by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, that
the action of an employee of the South Carolina Electric & Gas Com-
pany in requiring a negro woman to sit in the part of the bus re-
served for her race violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it
was done pursuant to the statute law of South Carolina requiring
such action, does no great harm. But since it is the part of a great
pattern of destruction, the writer cannot resist the temptation to
comment on the appalling ignorance in this country today concern-
ing the true concept of constitutional government which extends
even to the Supreme Court of the United States itself.
Do-gooders in all walks of life and at all levels of intelligence have
portrayed our government as one of perfection under which democra-
cy and perfect justice can and will always flourish. Such is neither
the American constitutional system nor the Anglo-Saxon theory of
20. 224 F. 2d 752 (1955).
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justice, and it has long been overdue that this be explained to our
naive public. Had the barons at Runnymede wished to secure per-
fect justice, they might have been satisfied with something different
from a trial by their peers. Many would have been happy with the
right to challenge to physical combat. But the whole truth of the
matter is that the wiley barons knew that by obtaining a trial by their
peers, many could escape punishment for crimes that they were guilty
of. Which, may we ask, is most likely to decide guilt or innocence
correctly, Judge Parker, the chief judge of our Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, or the jury in a magistrate's court? From
the abstract point of view there can be no argument. This simple
analogy points up the jury system in its true perspective. It was
never dreamed that perfect justice would be done in all cases. The
guilty might from time to time escape punishment and the innocent
might occasionally be found guilty. But the appellate courts are
available to overturn unjust convictions. The system is just as simple
as that. The Anglo-Saxon mind refused to seek abstract perfection.
He realized that human nature was at best imperfect and that any
system of justice based upon perfection could never succeed with
mere human beings.
That same recognition of human imperfection is the great genius
of the American constitutional system of government. Those who
wrote our Constitution evolved the greatest system of checks and
balances ever conceived. These checks and balances were in tacit
recognition of the impossibility of achieving abstract perfection in
any type of governmental set-up, and they were undoubtedly de-
signed in order that the greatest good could be done for the greatest
possible number.
They also provided for change where change was required. But
in so providing for changes, they recognized the conceit of succeed-
ing generations which might assume for themselves greater knowl-
edge than their predecessors, and deliberately slowed down the pro-
cess of change in order that those who proposed the changes might
pause and reflect upon their own apparent wisdom.
So sure were the agriculturists of the South and the merchants of
New England that a central government could not do justice on a
local basis, that they not only preserved the absolute integrity of the
states forming the Union, but they denied to the Federal government
any and all aspects of police power.21 But, unfortunately, those who
21. Compare Nigro v. U. S., 276 U.S. 332, 48 S. Ct. 388, 72 L. Ed. 600
(1927), upholding a conviction for violation of an early Federal narcotics act
upon the theory that the penalty provisions in the law relating to traffic in
[Vol. 9
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss1/6
SuRvEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
now hold office as judges of the United States Supreme Court seem
wholly ignorant of this Anglo-Saxon approach to representative gov-
ernment. And, because in their own minds, they have assuredly
achieved a wisdom denied to their predecessors, it does not occur
to them that they as a court should do anything less than to render
perfect justice on all occasions and preserve and promote democracy
in its purest aspects.
The great tragedy lies not only in the segregation decisions, for
the writer, for one, feels that the South can successfully resist them
in the main. The crime is that the court has promoted democracy as
a form of government to be sought for, oblivious of the fact that de-
mocracy, in its final analysis, represents no more than the unimpeded
will of the majority. As such it is the most primitive and cruel of all
types of government. Petty bickering undoubtedly brought about the
election of the tribal chieftain as a protection to the weaker from the
stronger members of the tribe. Slowly, through the centuries, and
at the expense of great human suffering and countless human lives
were the powers thus first voluntarily granted to the tribal chieftain
taken from his successor the absolute monarch. But those who wrote
our Constitution had a better memory than did the present Supreme
Court. They remembered man's bigotry toward his fellow man and
set up in our written Constitution a system of checks and balances
to prevent a return to absolute democracy, and to protect minorities
from unenlightened majorities. Thus, although democracy in its
final form is just what those who wrote our Constitution sought to
avoid, it is just what the nine wise men of the Federal Supreme Court
who now interpret the Constitution are plunging this country head-
long for. Only public enlightenment can prevent the pending disas-
ter, and it is time that the public began to think, in order that the
school children of today may be taught true values and shall not re-
main longer confused by glittering generalities and psychological dis-
courses. To live, the United States must have a government of
laws and not of men. It likewise must have courts willing to interpret
laws and not try to make them.
narcotics was incidental to the revenue phase of the act requiring the payment
of a license for the privilege of dealing in narcotics. In this case Chief Justice
Taft said "In interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure,
for otherwise it would be no law at all."
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